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affords me what I consider one phase of a functional doctrine. I hold both to be not only true, but equally indispensable to a complete account of feeling. I should not wish to call pleasantness and its opposite feeling as such. I prefer, as I have already indicated, to follow the usage which I think accords more nearly with our linguistic tradition, and I should, therefore, reserve the term for a total psychosis in which the factors just mentioned are dominant. I am by no means certain that these elements will indefinitely resist analysis, nor can I admit that relational psychoses are even now wholly unanalyzable, but nevertheless in the main I agree with Dr. Washburn so far as her view gives a statement provisionally acceptable for a structural psychology. Her connection of relational feelings with congenital motor attitudes is thoroughly congenial to my whole point of view, and I should only insist that this connection is no exclusive prerogative of such feelings. Every psychosis can, in my judgment, be stated in terms of motor activity and must be so stated in order to appreciate its full significance.

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COGNITIVE THOUGHT AND 'IMMEDIATE' EXPERIENCE

IN a former discussion I maintained that the genesis and plausibility of some recent metaphysical realisms were due to a confusion between the psychological and the logical treatments of thought. In the present discussion I shall endeavor to point out that the doctrine known as 'pure' or 'immediate' empiricism derives its plausibility in part from the same confusion. There is, indeed, to-day a widespread tendency to hypostatize experience, to regard it as the all-comprehending reality of which men and things are elements, from which thought sets out on its reflective quest and into which in the end it is somehow absorbed. But one does not find a distinction made and kept between experience as 'actual' and 'personal' and experience as 'possible.' What in strict logic holds only of the latter is asserted of the former, and *vice versa*. This treatment of experience one finds with varying contexts in Bradley and his disciples and in Professors Dewey and James. It is with the views of the latter two alone that I shall be herein concerned.

Professor James tells us that a physical object, *e. g.*, his pen, is an experience which may be taken in two contexts: (1) in the personal context of my or your experience; (2) as a pure experience or pen experience in itself. 'The pen experience,' we are told, 'in its original immediacy is not aware of itself: it simply is,'¹ etc. Now

¹ This JOURNAL, Vol. I., pp. 538, 566, etc.; Vol. II., p. 180, etc.

what does this latter expression mean? I have some notion of the existence of a physical object when no one thinks it. I have even a glimmering notion of what it might mean for the pen's existence to depend on the thought of an all-thinker. But I can frame no intelligible notion of what a pen is as a bit of pure 'physical' experience which no person has and which has itself no feeling. Surely it can only conduce to confusion of thought to apply the term experience to anything that actually figures in no consciousness.² If the personal *quale* be eliminated from experience there is nothing left but the bare *possibility* of experience, and surely it is a mistake to call an unconscious possibility experience? Words should have some sort of definite meaning even in philosophy, and the following definition of experience taken from the Century Dictionary states the actual historical meaning of the term and brings out its personal *quale*: "The state or fact of having made trial or proof, or of having acquired knowledge, wisdom, skill, etc., by actual trial or observation. Personal and practical acquaintance with anything."

The consequence of the loose use of this term 'experience' is that so short and easy a road is found to some all-comprehending unity of experience. We are told by James that the sum-total of experiences is a 'pure' experience on an enormous scale, undifferentiated and undifferentiable into thought and thing.³ Now this sum-total of experience, this 'pure' experience, either is had by some psychic center or it is not. In the latter case we are landed in a mist (I was about to say 'mysticism') which is fatal to clear thinking. We are told that experiences are 'confluent,' etc. Now *qua* experience my psychic life is uniquely and unsharably my own. As experiencing centers,

—"in the sea of life enisled,
With echoing straits between us thrown,
Dotting the shoreless watery wild,
We mortal millions live *alone*."

The interrelations of selves, the common truth and the social activity, doubtless do refer to common or over-individual conditions or implications of experience. But these common conditions must transcend any actual experience.⁴ I do not get my individual experiences by taking a slice out of a social or cosmic common-sensorium, nor can I without further ado logically 'pool' my experience in a social 'pot.'

² *Ibid.*, Vol. II., p. 181, etc.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. II., p. 181.

⁴ When Professor James says that 'experience itself, taken at large, can grow by itself,' that it 'proliferates' by 'continuous transitions,' etc., does he mean in the individual or is he talking about the totality of experience?

Professor Dewey does not assume that experience is a comprehensive flux or matrix in which all separate experiences meet and blend. Experience for him is always determinate.⁵ Every experience is a real thing and every change in experience is a change in reality. Determinate experiences are conterminous with things. There are just as many reals as there are experiences. He says that when I am frightened by a noise, that is one experience or 'thing,' and when I discover that the cause of the noise is the flapping of the window-blind, that is another real thing. And when I see Zöllner's lines as convergent they *really* are convergent. When the experience is corrected we have a new real. Now, of course, all my experiences, whether judgments true or false, hallucinations, emotions good and bad, and what not, are actual in the sense of having psychical existence. The plausibility of Professor Dewey's contention that reality = immediate experience is due to the paralogism of identifying the psychically existent with the total reality, 'actual' with 'possible' experience. In logic, as I have previously insisted, reality is primarily that which judgment *means* or *refers to*. In the Zöllner line illusion my experience as cognitive gets the wrong reference. My percept does not mean what I take it to mean. And I reconstruct or transform this particular bit of cognitive experience by a reference to other conditions of the perception, *i. e.*, by reference to a more systematized experience of reality. Similarly, when I discover the cause of the noise I may not alter at all the fact of 'window-blind-wind-blowing.' I make a new judgment by a systematic reference and so alter my personal state. In such cases we rectify our cognitive relations, not the external reality. These rectifications mean that the references of our meanings to the reality which has not changed must be altered in order that cognition may work.

Professor Dewey insists that any experience is determinate. He says the vague impression of something in the dark "is as 'good' a reality as the self-luminous vision of an absolute." But it isn't if it does not work as well. If I take this vague impression for a soft couch and it turns out to be a coil of hot steam-pipes or a bathtub, I do not consider my former judgment to be 'good.' I say it was an erroneous experience and the steam-pipes are and *were* real all the time. Professor Dewey insists that to find the meaning of any philosophic concept we must go to experience. True! but how? to whose experience? and how shall experience be controlled? We must *think* in order to make experience yield its fruitage, and because it fails to yield complete fullness and harmony our thought must continue ever to transcend actual experience in its own inter-

⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. II., p. 393, ff.

ests. The urge and stress of thinking is born of the partial failure and partial promise of actual experience. Professor Dewey says that the method of immediate empiricism is identical in kind with that of the scientist. But the scientist is continually remaking experiences and by thought constructions transcending the actual. The all-pervading frictionless, massless fluid and the electric corpuscles of the physicist certainly transcend immediate experience. Actual experience, which always belongs to a self and hence is not a substantive reality, does not stand self-sufficient on its own feet. If every determinate experience did so stand, like Professor James's 'pure' pen experience, unconscious and absolute in its own right, of course there would be no occasion for thought's corrective and supplementary work. Things would be just what they seem even when there was no one for them to 'seem' to. The sun would go round the earth, there would be two marbles when the finger-tips are crossed in the Aristotelian experiment, two moons in the sky for the extreme devotees of Bacchus, etc. The strictly theoretical parts of physical science abound in thought constructions by which actual experience is corrected, made more consistent, supplemented. Of course the value of these constructions has reference to a 'possible' self-consistent or complete experience, but this is an ideal which becomes actualized only in part. And even in the case of a perfect 'possible' experience, if we do not presuppose an experiencing center or self, we are assuming an unconscious experience had by no one. Such a conception seems to me to have about as much meaning as 'wooden iron.' In short, pure or immediate experience is the hypostatization of the psychological abstraction of consciousness or experience 'in general.' It is legitimate for the psychologist to treat consciousness as a fact by itself, but is it legitimate to assert that experience is the bed-rock of reality apart from whether any self has consciousness of it or not? And if we stick to the personal *quale* of experience all philosophical concepts will not be found on the same level or yield their meanings in the same terms. So-called immediate experience is simply the indifferent starting-point for all philosophy as for all science and rational activity. But it is shot through and through with mediacy, and it is the function of reflective thought to justify the element of mediacy in each specific case.

Our 'immediate' experiences are being constantly corrected by thought. This is notoriously the case with perceptual experience. But it is quite as true that esthetic, personal and religious experiences do not yield their full fruitage without the interpreting and transforming activity of cognition, an activity that does its work by developing the element of mediation already there and without which experience would be a meaningless 'brute' datum.

Just herein lies the dynamic and constructive quality of thought. The vital function of thought consists in submitting immediate experiences to a reflective treatment by which they are made to yield up to thought interpretation of their meanings and submit to control and transformation at the hands of thought. Mere thought is not life, but thought's contribution to life consists in interpreting, transforming, harmonizing and supplementing actual experiences. This work logical thinking performs just because it is not a mere psychological existent on a dead-level with every sort of grain and smut that may be grist for the psychological mill. In the performance of this work cognitive thinking transcends a mere psychical existence and reaches beyond actual experience. It develops implications in regard to the real that are required to render more consistent and harmonious actual experiences that are in themselves fragmentary. These implications, we may say, refer to some self's *possible* experiences, but they are not now convertible, and we may not understand the conditions under which they may become convertible, into the current coin of our immediate experiences. In this sense, reality for thought that goes to the bitter end must include implications that are only 'possible' experiences.

Every immediate experience has, without further consideration, whatever reality may belong to *any* psychical process. In this sense cognition is just one element in experience. But when we remind ourselves that thought as psychological fact and thought as valid meaning or reference are two different things, and that it is in the latter sense alone that thought in its dynamic actuality is adequately conceived, we shall not make the mistake of putting cognition on a level with other psychical facts and so eliminating its transcendent reference.

The psychological treatment of thought is responsible for the assumption that reality equals experience. It is one thing to say experience is real (and, of course, all experience is real in the sense of being actual psychical process, although we hardly need a new philosophy to convey this very obvious bit of information) and quite another thing to say that *all reality* is immediate experience. Our immediate experiences, cognitive and non-cognitive, are often misleading, fragmentary and inharmonious. Reality in the fullest sense means the objective system of conditions in relation to which these experiences may get corrected, enlarged, harmonized. Of course, thought must make a difference to reality, both extra-experiential and intra-experiential, and *some* reality must be of the sort to which thought can make a difference. Thought both transforms experience and alters some elements in reality, so making way for a readjustment of experience. Of what sort this reality must be so to undergo

the action of thought is a question remaining over—the metaphysical problem of logic.

In his latest discussion⁶ Dewey lays emphasis on the end-state of knowledge as saturated with emotion. Knowledge mediates activities whose aims are the development of emotional substrates or continua into perfect feeling-harmonies, moral, esthetic, personal. Now it seems to me perfectly true that the goal of a completed cognition is always a personal state suffused with emotional coloring. But I should deny that the *differentiæ* of cognitive feeling are reducible to moral and esthetic terms. Since all higher feeling is a reaction of the unity of self to a content, cognition involves feeling, and the articulation of knowledge is the articulation of feeling. But I should maintain that the personal feeling which accompanies any relatively complete insight in science or philosophy may have a unique *quale* due to the specific character of the cognitive reaction. In other words, cognitive feeling may be and often is *sui generis*, *i. e.*, not reducible to moral, esthetic, or religious terms. And I should agree with the contention that thought has always personal reference, while insisting that 'pragmatism' ignores the ontological implications of this reference.

Thought is never wholly external to any personal experience. 'Pure' experience devoid of thought is a *Grenzbegriff*. There are two chief desiderata in the epistemological treatment of experience: (1) the explication of the chief logical stages, through which, in the individual and the race, experience passes by the action of reflective thinking, and which stages run, of course, from a beginning in which thought is inchoate to a relative conclusion in which it has become definitely articulated; (2) the explication of the objective or universal implications of the individuals having experience. This is the problem of the definition of an environing world or reality, social and physical. The fact that my experience is uniquely my own, as well as determinate, does not abolish but rather sets a metaphysical problem.

We are repeatedly told that pragmatic empiricism is a new 'method' of treating philosophical concepts. But, so far, we have been given only vague generalities, and those of us who are not convinced thereby are told that it is because we are irretrievably mired in the bog of transcendentalism. 'By their fruits ye shall know them.' Let the pragmatists, or immediate, empiricists give us a thoroughgoing treatment by their method of one or two fundamental philosophical concepts, substance, causality, thinghood, selfhood, etc., and then perhaps the actual demonstration of the pragmatic uses of this 'method' will let light into our skulls. In the meantime, per-

⁶ This JOURNAL, Vol. II., pp. 707-711.

haps one may be pardoned for the perversity of holding on to a point of view which seems both to be more in harmony with the whole procedure and function of reflective thought and to have yielded some definite results. And I will be specific and say that I mean that the philosophies of Kant, Fichte and Hegel have yielded definite results in rendering the actual world more intelligible in terms of an idealistic⁷ rendering of experience.

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DISCUSSION

THE QUARREL ABOUT TRANSCENDENCY

PROFESSOR JAMES has said: "Does it not seem as if the quarrel about self-transcendancy in knowledge might drop? Is it not a purely verbal dispute? Call it self-transcendancy or call it pointing, whichever you like—it makes no difference so long as real transitions toward real goals are admitted as things given *in* experience, and among experience's most indefeasible parts."¹ I believe these words apply to more than one philosophic issue, but I take up now only that about transcendent objects. The arguments on both sides grow so numerous and complicated that one feels the need of stopping to ask: What does it all amount to? The radical empiricist is concerned to define externality in experiential terms: the realist is equally concerned to show that in this definition something is omitted, unaccounted for, namely, the transcendent external object. But does it make any difference to practical life or to one's system of philosophy whether the realist is right or wrong in this?

Let us state very roughly what has resulted from the discussion so far, so as to get the issue before us. The empiricists began by defining knowledge in practical terms. It was objected that this laid so much stress on the subjective side as to exclude real external things and standards. Doubtless the word 'experience' was partly to blame for this, since it has usually signified a personal and subjective affair in contrast with the things with which it was conversant. If given a definite meaning, it would naturally mean the experience limited to one's own body.² But the empiricists replied that theirs was no such narrow view. They have, after all, as much good common sense as the realists, and believe in a real objective world. For them 'experience' is no more subjective than objective;

⁷ When I use the term 'idealism' without qualifying phrase I mean metaphysical, *not* epistemological or psychological idealism.

¹ This JOURNAL, Vol. II., p. 237.

² W. Fite, *Philosophical Review*, January, 1906.